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Abstract
The boxdot conjecture asserts that every normal modal logic that faithfully inter-
prets T by the well-known boxdot translation is in fact included in T. We confirm that
the conjecture is true. More generally, we present a simple semantic condition on modal
logics L0 which ensures that the largest logic where L0 embeds faithfully by the boxdot
translation is L0 itself. In particular, this natural generalization of the boxdot conjecture
holds for S4, S5, and KTB in place of T.
1 The boxdot translation
The boxdot translation is the mapping ϕ 7→ ϕ ·✷ from the language of monomodal logic into
itself that preserves propositional variables, commutes with Boolean connectives, and satisfies
(✷ϕ)
·✷ = ·✷ϕ
·✷,
where ·✷ϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ ∧✷ϕ. It is easy to see that for any normal modal logic L,
the set of formulas interpreted in L by the boxdot translation,
L
·✷−1 = {ϕ : ⊢L ϕ
·✷},
is also a normal modal logic (nml), and contains the logic T = K ⊕ ✷p → p. The boxdot
translation is a faithful interpretation of T in the smallest nml K (i.e., K ·✷
−1
= T), and more
generally, in any logic between K and T. The boxdot conjecture, formulated by French and
Humberstone [4], states that the converse also holds:
L
·✷−1 = T =⇒ L ⊆ T.
French and Humberstone proved the conjecture for logics L axiomatized by formulas of modal
degree 1, and Steinsvold [5] has shown it for logics of the form L = K ⊕ ✸h✷ip → ✷j✸kp,
but the full conjecture remained unsettled.
∗Supported by grant IAA100190902 of GA AV CˇR, Center of Excellence CE-ITI under the grant
P202/12/G061 of GA CˇR, and RVO: 67985840.
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In this paper we will establish the boxdot conjecture. The argument actually uses only one
particular property of T, namely that Kripke frames for T can be blown up by duplicating
each node in a frame in a certain way, and this allows us to state an analogue of the conjecture
for a large class of reflexive logics.
Given an arbitrary nml L0 ⊇ T, we may ask about the structure of logics L in which L0
faithfully embeds by the boxdot translation (L ·✷
−1
= L0). First, there is always at least one
such logic, for example L0 itself: this follows from the observation that ⊢T ϕ↔ ϕ
·✷ for every
formula ϕ. If L0 = K⊕X for some set of axioms X, then the logic L
·✷
0
= K⊕{ϕ ·✷ : ϕ ∈ X}
has the property
L0 ⊆ L
·✷−1 iff L ·✷0 ⊆ L,
in particular L ·✷
0
⊆ L0 is the smallest logic in which L0 faithfully embeds. Clearly, the set
of logics such that L ·✷
−1
= L0 is convex : if L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L3 and L
·✷−1
1
= L ·✷
−1
3
= L0, then
L ·✷
−1
2
= L0. Finally, if {Lc : c ∈ C} is a chain of logics linearly ordered by inclusion such that
L ·✷
−1
c = L0 for each c ∈ C, the logic L =
⋃
c∈C Lc also satisfies L
·✷−1 = L0. It follows from
Zorn’s lemma that every logic in which L0 faithfully embeds is included in a maximal such
logic.
Thus, if {Lm : m ∈ M} is the set of all maximal logics such that L
·✷−1
m = L0, the set of
all logics in which L0 faithfully embeds by the boxdot translation consists of the union
(1)
⋃
m∈M
[L ·✷0 , Lm]
of intervals in the lattice of normal modal logics. Notice that L0 is itself one of the maximal
logics Lm, as L
·✷−1 = L for any L ⊇ L0 (or L ⊇ T for that matter). For a nontrivial example,
A∗ = GL⊕✷✷p→ ✷( ·✷p→ q) ∨ ✷( ·✷q → p) is a maximal logic in which S4Grz embeds [2,
Exer. 9.26].
The original boxdot conjecture states that T is the largest logic L such that L ·✷
−1
= T.
In accordance with this, we define that a nml L0 ⊇ T has the boxdot property, if
(BDP) L
·✷−1 = L0 =⇒ L ⊆ L0
holds for every nml L. In light of the discussion above, BDP for L0 is equivalent to the claim
that there is only one maximal logic L such that L ·✷
−1
= L0, or in other words, that the
union in (1) reduces to the single interval [L ·✷
0
, L0].
What we are going to show is that BDP holds for all logics L0 satisfying a natural semantic
condition (which we will define precisely in Section 4). Since the condition applies to T, this
also establishes the original boxdot conjecture. Moreover, our proof shows that under the
same condition, L0 has the strong boxdot property :
(SBDP) L
·✷−1 ⊆ L0 =⇒ L ⊆ L0.
We do not know whether BDP and SBDP are equivalent in general, though they of course
express the same condition when L0 = T.
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2 Preliminaries
We first recall elementary concepts from relational semantics to agree on the notation.
Definition 2.1 A Kripke frame is a pair W = 〈W,R〉, where R is a binary relation on a
set W . A model based on the frame W is a triple M = 〈W,R,〉, where the valuation  is a
relation between elements of W and modal formulas, written as M, w  ϕ, which satisfies
M, w  ϕ→ ψ iff M, w 2 ϕ or M, w  ψ,
M, w  ✷ϕ iff ∀v ∈W (w R v ⇒M, v  ϕ),
and similarly for other Boolean connectives. A formula ϕ holds in M if M, w  ϕ for
every w ∈ W , and it is valid in W, written as W  ϕ, if M  ϕ for every model M based
on W. If L is a nml,W is a Kripke L-frame if W  ϕ for every ϕ ∈ L. A logic L is sound wrt
a class C of frames if every W ∈ C is an L-frame, and it is complete wrt C if ϕ /∈ L implies
W 2 ϕ for some W ∈ C.
A cluster in a transitive frame 〈W,R〉 is an equivalence class of the equivalence relation ∼
on W defined by
w ∼ v iff w = v ∨ (w R v ∧ v R w).
We will also consider the general frame semantics. The reason is mostly esthetic—we do
not want to encumber our results with the arbitrary restriction to Kripke-complete logics L0
which does not seem to have anything to do with the problem under investigation. A reader
who is only interested in the original boxdot conjecture (L0 = T), or more generally in BDP
or SBDP for Kripke-complete logics L0, may safely ignore general frames in what follows.
Definition 2.2 A general frame is a triple W = 〈W,R,A〉, where 〈W,R〉 is a Kripke frame,
and A is a family of subsets of W which is closed under Boolean operations, and under the
operation
✷X = {w ∈W : ∀v ∈W (w R v ⇒ v ∈ X)}.
Sets X ∈ A are called admissible. A model M = 〈W,R,〉 is based on W if the set
{w ∈W :M, w  p}
is admissible for every variable p (which implies the same holds for all formulas). A formula
is valid in W if it holds in all models based on W, and the notions of L-frames, soundness,
and completeness are defined accordingly. A Kripke frame 〈W,R〉 can be identified with the
general frame 〈W,R,P(W )〉.
We will also need basic validity-preserving operations on frames and models.
Definition 2.3 A Kripke frame 〈W ′, R′〉 is a generated subframe of W = 〈W,R〉 if W ′ ⊆W ,
and R′ = R ∩ (W ′ ×W ). (Note that W ′ ⊆W is a carrier of a generated subframe of W iff it
is upward closed under R.) If 〈W,R〉 and 〈W ′, R′〉 are Kripke frames, a mapping f : W →W ′
is a p-morphism, provided
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(i) w R v implies f(w) R′ f(v),
(ii) if f(w) R′ v′, there is u ∈W such that w R u and f(u) = v′,
for every w, v ∈W and v′ ∈W ′. Notice that the image of a p-morphism is always a generated
subframe of W ′.
Similarly, a general frame 〈W ′, R′, A′〉 is a generated subframe of a frame 〈W,R,A〉 if the
Kripke frame 〈W ′, R′〉 is a generated subframe of 〈W,R〉, and A′ = {X ∩W ′ : X ∈ A}. A
p-morphism from a general frame 〈W,R,A〉 to 〈W ′, R′, A′〉 is a p-morphism from the Kripke
frame 〈W,R〉 to 〈W ′, R′〉 which additionally satisfies
(iii) f−1[X ′] ∈ A for every X ′ ∈ A′.
Fact 2.4 ([1, Thm. 3.14, Prop. 5.72]) Let W and W ′ be Kripke or general frames, and
ϕ a formula valid in W. If W ′ is a generated subframe of W, or if there exists a p-morphism
from W onto W ′, then W ′  ϕ. ✷
In more detail, p-morphisms preserve truth in models in the following way.
Fact 2.5 ([1, Prop. 2.14]) If M = 〈W,R,〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′,〉 are models, ϕ is a
formula, and f is a p-morphism from 〈W,R〉 to 〈W ′, R′〉 such thatM, w  pi ⇔M
′, f(w)  pi
for every w ∈W and every variable pi occurring in ϕ, then M, w  ϕ⇔M
′, f(w)  ϕ. ✷
We have been using ⊢L ϕ as a synonym for ϕ ∈ L, however we will also extend this
notation to allow for nonlogical axioms.
Definition 2.6 For any nml L, ⊢L denotes the global consequence relation of L: if X is a
set of formulas, and ϕ a formula, then X ⊢L ϕ iff ϕ has a finite derivation using elements
of X, theorems of L, modus ponens, and necessitation.
The global consequence relation satisfies the following version of the deduction theorem, where
✷
nϕ = ✷ · · ·✷︸ ︷︷ ︸
n boxes
ϕ, and ✷≤nϕ =
∧n
i=0✷
iϕ.
Fact 2.7 ([2, Thm. 3.51]) X ⊢L ϕ iff there is a finite subset X0 ⊆ X and a natural num-
ber n such that ✷≤n
∧
X0 → ϕ ∈ L. ✷
3 Motivation
Before we introduce the semantic condition that will guarantee the SBDP for a logic L0 ⊇ T,
let us give some intuition. This section is mostly informal, its purpose is to explain that the
condition does not come out of blue, but follows naturally from the properties of the boxdot
translation. However, the argument uses a somewhat heavier machinery than the rest of the
paper, hence it is intended for readers familiar with the structure theory of transitive modal
logics (see e.g. [2] for more background). It can be skipped without losing continuity, though
some of the counterexamples in Example 3.1 may be worth bearing in mind.
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Assume that L * L0, we would like to show that L
·✷−1 * L0. If L0 has the finite model
property, there is a finite rooted L0-frame F which is not an L-frame. If L and L0 are
transitive (i.e., extensions of K4), we can consider a frame formula AF as in Fine [3]: AF
is invalid in a transitive frame W iff F is a p-morphic image of a generated subframe of W.
(Note that we will not actually use frame formulas in the proof of our main result below.)
Clearly 0L0 AF .
Do we have ⊢L A
·✷
F ? Well, if not, and if L is Kripke-complete for simplicity, there is an
L-frameW = 〈W,R〉 such that W 2 A ·✷F . This means that AF is invalid in the reflexivization
W◦ = 〈W,R ∪ id〉, hence F is a p-morphic image of a generated subframe of W◦. Since
the class of L-frames is closed under generated subframes, we may assume that there is a
p-morphism f from W◦ itself onto F .
If f were a p-morphism from W to F , then F would be an L-frame contrary to the
assumptions. This contradiction would show that ⊢L A
·✷
F , providing an example for L
·✷−1 *
L0. In general, f does not have to be a p-morphism from W to F , however the only way this
can fail is that for some w ∈ W , there is no u ∈ W such that w R u and f(w) = f(u). The
key observation is that this cannot happen if all clusters of F have more than one element:
then we can fix v′ 6= f(w) in the same cluster as f(w); since f is a p-morphism from W◦
to F , there must be w R v R u such that f(v) = v′ and f(u) = f(w) (where necessarily
w 6= v 6= u), and we have w R u by transitivity.
This suggests that a (transitive) logic L0 will satisfy SBDP if the class of L0-frames is
closed under the operation of blowing up each cluster by adding new elements. On the other
hand, there are examples implying that some condition of that sort is necessary, which shows
that we are on the right track:
Example 3.1 The logic S4Grz corresponds to noetherian partially ordered frames. In par-
ticular, such frames only have one-element clusters. S4Grz does not have the BDP: it is well
known that GL ·✷
−1
= S4Grz, but GL * S4Grz (in fact, GL and S4Grz have no consistent
common extension).
Similarly, top-most clusters in S4.1-frames can only have one element, and BDP duly fails
for S4.1: for example, L ·✷
−1
= S4.1, where L = K4⊕ ·✸✷⊥ (this logic is complete wrt finite
transitive frames whose top clusters are irreflexive).
The motivational argument above may give the false impression that it is enough for
(S)BDP if we can blow up one-element clusters in L0-frames to have at least two elements,
and leave the rest unchanged, but this is only an artifact of the stipulation that L is transitive.
For a simple counterexample, let L0 be the logic of the two-element cluster C2, and L the
logic of the (nontransitive) frame I2 = 〈{0, 1}, {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 0〉}〉. Then L
·✷−1 = L0 as I
◦
2
= C2,
but L * L0: e.g., ⊢L p ∧✷(✷p→ p)→ ✷p, which is not valid in L0.
4 The boxdot property
The concept of clusters does not make much sense for nontransitive frames, nevertheless the
operation of doubling the size of each cluster can be easily generalized to arbitrary frames
while retaining its most salient properties.
5
Definition 4.1 For any Kripke frame W = 〈W,R〉, we define a new frame 2W = 〈2W, 2R〉
by putting 2W =W × {0, 1}, and
〈w, a〉 2R 〈v, b〉 iff w R v
for any w, v ∈ W and a, b ∈ {0, 1}. If W = 〈W,R,A〉 is a general frame, we put 2W =
〈2W, 2R, 2A〉, where
2A =
{
(X × {0}) ∪ (Y × {1}) : X,Y ∈ A
}
.
We remark that a similar construction of modal frames from intuitionistic frames is employed
in [2] under the name τ2 for investigation of the Go¨del translation.
The following is immediate from the definition.
Observation 4.2 If W is a Kripke or general frame, the natural projection pi : 2W → W is
a p-morphism. ✷
Motivated by the discussion in Section 3, we will consider logics with the following property.
Assumption 4.3 L0 is a normal modal logic complete with respect to a class C of Kripke or
general frames such that 2W is an L0-frame for every W ∈ C.
Notice that even though it is not explicitly demanded, the assumption implies that L0 is
sound wrt C because of Fact 2.4 and Observation 4.2.
Example 4.4 It is readily seen that ifW is reflexive, symmetric, or transitive, then so is 2W.
Thus, Assumption 4.3 holds for T, KTB, S4, and S5. For reflexive transitive frames, 2W
has the simple geometric interpretation of expanding each cluster of W to twice its original
size, which implies that Assumption 4.3 also holds for S4.2 and S4.3.
We come to our main result.
Theorem 4.5 Every logic L0 ⊇ T satisfying Assumption 4.3 has the strong boxdot property.
Proof: Let L be a nml such that L * L0. We fix a formula ϕ ∈ L such that ϕ /∈ L0, and we
will construct a formula χ such that χ ·✷ ∈ L and χ /∈ L0, witnessing that L
·✷−1 * L0.
Let Sub(ϕ) denote the set of all subformulas of ϕ. We choose a propositional variable
q /∈ Sub(ϕ), and consider the finite set of formulas
X =
{
✷(qe → ψ)→ ψ : e ∈ {0, 1},✷ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ)
}
,
where q1 = q, q0 = ¬q.
Claim 1
(i) X ·✷ ⊢K ✷ψ
·✷ → ψ ·✷ for every ✷ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) (even without the use of necessitation).
(ii) X ·✷ ⊢K ψ ↔ ψ
·✷ for every ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ).
6
Proof: (i): We have
⊢K q
e ∧ ✷ψ
·✷ → ·✷(q1−e → ψ
·✷)
for e = 0, 1, and X ·✷ includes the formula ·✷(q1−e → ψ ·✷)→ ψ ·✷, which yields
X
·✷ ⊢K q
e → (✷ψ
·✷ → ψ
·✷).
The result follows using ⊢K q ∨ ¬q.
(ii): By induction on the complexity of ψ. The steps for variables and Boolean connectives
are straightforward. If ψ = ✷ψ0, we have X
·✷ ⊢K ψ0 ↔ ψ
·✷
0
by the induction hypothesis,
hence
X
·✷ ⊢K ✷ψ0 ↔ ✷ψ
·✷
0
using necessitation and K. However,
X
·✷ ⊢K ✷ψ
·✷
0 ↔ ·✷ψ
·✷
0
by (i), whence X ·✷ ⊢K ✷ψ0 ↔ ·✷ψ
·✷
0
= (✷ψ0)
·✷. ✷ (Claim 1)
By Claim 1 and the choice of ϕ, we have X ·✷ ⊢L ϕ
·✷, hence
⊢L ✷
≤n
∧
X
·✷ → ϕ
·✷
for some n by Fact 2.7. (In fact, one can take for n the modal degree of ϕ, but we will not
need this.) In other words, ⊢L χ
·✷, where
χ = ✷n
∧
X → ϕ.
It remains to show that 0L0 χ. The argument below actually gives the slightly stronger
conclusion X 0L0 ϕ.
Since 0L0 ϕ, there is a frame W ∈ C such that W 2 ϕ by Assumption 4.3. We can
fix a model M = 〈W,R,〉 based on W, and w0 ∈ W such that M, w0 2 ϕ. We define a
model 2M = 〈2W, 2R,〉 based on 2W by putting
2M, 〈w, a〉  q iff a = 1,
2M, 〈w, a〉  pi iff M, w  pi
for every w ∈W , a ∈ {0, 1}, and every variable pi distinct from q. We have
(2) 2M, 〈w, a〉  ψ iff M, w  ψ
for every w ∈ W , a ∈ {0, 1}, and ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ) by Fact 2.5 and Observation 4.2, in particular
2M, 〈w0, a〉 2 ϕ. On the other hand, consider any formula
✷(qe → ψ)→ ψ
from X. If 2M, 〈w, a〉 2 ψ, we have M, w 2 ψ by (2), hence M, v 2 ψ for some w R v as
W  L0 ⊇ T. (IfW is a Kripke frame, it has to be reflexive, in which case we can simply take
v = w.) Then 2M, 〈v, e〉  qe∧¬ψ by (2), and 〈w, a〉 2R 〈v, e〉, thus 2M, 〈w, a〉 2 ✷(qe → ψ).
We have verified that 2M  X and 2M 2 ϕ. By assumption, 2W is an L0-frame, hence
X 0L0 ϕ. ✷
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Corollary 4.6 The logics T, KTB, S4, S5, S4.2 and S4.3 have the SBDP. In particular,
the boxdot conjecture is true. ✷
It is natural to ask how far is Assumption 4.3 from being a necessary and sufficient
criterion for (S)BDP. On the positive side, it is possible to show using similar techniques as in
Section 3 that our condition gives full characterization of (S)BDP for well-behaved transitive
logics:
Proposition 4.7 If L0 ⊇ S4 has the finite model property, the following are equivalent.
(i) L0 has the BDP.
(ii) L0 has the SBDP.
(iii) L0 satisfies Assumption 4.3 for some C.
(iv) L0 satisfies Assumption 4.3 for every class C of general frames with respect to which it
is sound and complete.
(v) L0 is the smallest modal companion of some superintuitionistic logic (see [2, §9.6]).
Proof sketch: (ii)→ (i) and (iv)→ (iii) are trivial, and (iii)→ (ii) is Theorem 4.5. (v)→ (iv)
follows from the fact that W and 2W induce the same intuitionistic frame.
(i) → (iii): Let C be the class of all finite rooted L0-frames. For each F ∈ C, let F
• be
the (not necessarily transitive) frame obtained from F by making all points irreflexive, and
let L be the logic determined by {F• : F ∈ C}. Since (F•)◦ = F , we have L ·✷
−1
= L0, hence
L ⊆ L0 by (i). Since L ⊇ wK4 = K⊕ ·✷p→ ✷✷p, we can use Fine frame formulas as in the
transitive case. In particular, L ⊆ L0 implies that for every F ∈ C, there is a p-morphism
f : G• ։ F for some G ∈ C. We use it to construct a mapping g : G → 2F as follows. If
x ∈ F , and c is a maximal cluster of G intersecting f−1[x], then |c ∩ f−1[x]| ≥ 2 as G• is
irreflexive while F is reflexive. Thus, we can split c ∩ f−1[x] in two nonempty parts that
are respectively mapped to 〈x, 0〉 and 〈x, 1〉 by g. Other elements of f−1[x] are mapped, say,
to 〈x, 0〉. It is easy to check that g is a p-morphism of G onto 2F , hence 2F is an L0-frame.
Consequently, L0 satisfies Assumption 4.3 wrt C.
(iii)→ (v): This can be shown using the machinery of Zakharyaschev’s canonical formulas
(see [2, §9] for an explanation, which is outside the scope of this paper). Let α(F ,D,⊥) be a
canonical formula based on a reflexive F , F ′ be a frame obtained from F by shrinking each
cluster to (at least) half its original size, and D′ be the corresponding set of closed domains.
Then any cofinal subreduction of W  S4 to F ′ with the closed domain condition for D′
can be lifted to a cofinal subreduction of 2W to F with CDC for D. Using Assumption 4.3,
this shows that ⊢L0 α(F ,D,⊥) implies ⊢L0 α(F
′,D′,⊥). Repeating this process yields an
axiomatization of L0 over S4 by formulas α(F ,D,⊥) where F has only simple clusters, which
means that L0 is of the form (v). ✷
However, the situation appears to be more complicated in the case of nontransitive L0.
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